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President Nixon: Toughing It Out with the Law 
by William Van Alstyne 
An exponent of toughing it out with the law, President 
Nixon makes such vast and startling claims to 
executive authority that the issue is changed from 
one of political judgment to the counterfeit issue of 
constitutional authority. This conduct has obscured 
the true issues in Supreme Court nominations, war 
powers, executive impoundment of funds, and 
executive privilege in the tapes controversy. 
I N THE CASE of the watergate tapes, President 
Nixon engaged in toughing it out with the law. In 
his own terms, this is a highly principled thing to do-
standing on his authority as president, protecting the 
powers of the office from erosion, resisting pressures 
from Congress and the press, standing tall in the courts. 
This was his reiteTated position as he attempted to make 
plain why nondisclosure of the tapes was required by 
the imperatives of candor and frankness in White House 
conversations. 
The issue, as he put it, was not the lesser one of the 
possible value of the tape.s to the Senate select com-
mittee or the special prosecutor, but the more enduring 
one of proper authority. To yield the tapes would be 
to violate the confidence of all persons having conver-
sation with the president, even on the most sensitive is-
sues, and to impair irreparably the operation of his of-
fice. The people must somehow be made to understand 
the problem in these impersonal and constitutional 
terms. They must be made to understand this even if 
it means discharging prosecutors and attorneys general. 
As 1 listen to the president, however, I cannot avoid 
an uneasy feeling of de/a vu. Something about the situa-
tion does not quite hang together, and the unmentioned 
facts, once remembered, begin to take shape with similar 
uses he has made of toughing it out with the law. 
In 1971 I combed through a decade of federal case 
reporters attempting to gain some perspective on the 
judicial decisions of G. Harrold Carswell, who was then 
under consideration before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee for appointment to the Supreme Court. I had 
a degree of personal interest in Judge Carswell's nomi-
nation, having previously thought a great deal about the 
earlier nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., 
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whose confirmation I had supported in testimony before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. (In fact, I continue to 
believe that Judge Haynsworth would have served with 
distinction on the Supreme Court.) 
In 1972 I was in the law library again, for a longer 
time, in an effort to trace the constitutional history of 
the war power. 
Only a few months ago I looked up materials that 
might help me understand the basis for President Nix-
on's claim that somehow enabled him to impound funds 
Congress had appropriated to be spent. Somewhere in 
between, I had also been there to see whether, as the 
president claimed, he enjoyed an executive privilege to 
engage in domestic wiretapping without authorization 
by Congress or oonstitutional review by the courts. 
Nixon Changed Issues, Deflected Attention 
In each of these situations certain circumstances were 
mpeated. For instance, in each President Nixon asserted 
a claim of constitutional authority that was itself so vast 
and startling as virtually to cause a shift in attention by 
an escalation of the issue. It was no longer a question 
of the propriety or merits of his position as a poHtical 
matter but a larger and very different question of author-
ity: not whether "power was being used wisely and sen-
sitively, but whether it existed on the colossal scale the 
president claimed. 
Coincidence or not, escalation of the issue was adroit-
ly employed to subdue criticism of the president's per-
sonal judgment, deflecting public attention away from 
the merits of what he was doing to the different matter 
of his technical authority to do it. Moreover, on thot>e 
occasions when the courts rejected the transmogrified 
issue of authority, finding it without constitutional basis, 
even that conclusion was used to poiitical advantage. 
The president would transfer the onus of "misunder-
standing" to the judiciary, taking the high ground that 
he merely had tried faithfully to vindicate the respon-
sibilities of his office, but that the judiciary had tied 
his hands. 
In the case of the Watergate tapes, this political tech-
nique again repeated itself. Executive privilege, what-
ever its scope, is at most what the words suggest-a 
privilege or option the president has and not a duty. 
There is no requirement that it be asserted. When presi-
dents have thought it important to remove doubt and to 
assist other departments of government in their under-
takings, materials subject to the privilege have been re-
leased willingly. The privilege is hardly ravaged by the 
exercise of discretion in taking recourse to it; rather, it 
stands more to be thrown into disrepute by its selective 
use, as in the Watergate affair, when it has the appear-
ance of a cover-up. 
Who Can Exercise "Executive Privilege"? 
Second, the privilege is that of the president-not of 
anyone who happens to converse with him. It is em-
phatically dissimilar to other privileges the president 
used for comparison in his televised address of August 
14, such as the privilege of a client not to have his at-
torney divulge certain matters without the client's per-
mission (but note, even this does not run to statements 
of intention to violate the law), or of a patient not to 
have his physician disclose certain matters without his 
permission and relevant to his diagnosis. In respect to 
executive privilege, however, it is perfectly well under-
stood that no one has a legal claim of curtaining any-
thing he may have told the president from disclosure 
when the president thinks it in the public interest to 
report it. 
Third, the president's use of the privilege in this in-
stance was markedly at odds with his public commitment 
made before existence of the tapes was known that, in 
view of the fact that sufficient evidence respecting the 
appearance of White House involvement in criminal 
activities had accumulated, it would be his policy to 
reopen the investigation and co-operate with the: select 
committee and the special prosecutor to restore public 
confidence. It is remarkable to think in what way the 
withholding of the tapes could have fitted that earlier 
description of the national interest. 
Fourth, there is the fact that the president already had 
bmached the confidences of parties to the conversations, 
not only releasing each person to testify as to what he 
said but also as to what others present during the same 
meeting said, even going so far as to lend certain 
among the tapes to H. R. Haldeman for Mr. Halde-
man's appearance before the select committee. In es-
sence, the president said that the national interest is best 
served by a self-serving breach of some person's con-
fidence and the personal loan of the corroborative tapes 
to a person he knew would testify that the disputed sub-
stance of certain conversations confirmed his own ver-
sion. 
Nixon Could Have Confined His Objections 
Finally, insofar as there may be portions of the tapes 
bearing on extraneous matters truly not pertinent to the 
business of the select committee or the special prose-
cutor, the president could have confined his objection 
to these. In case of a direct challenge that und.er the 
circumstances it would not be appropriate for the presi-
dent alone to say which portions of which tapes were 
truly irrelevant (any more, say, than it would be ap-
propriate for the select committee or the prosecutor to 
make that determination unilaterally), a federal court 
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could provide an in camera review, exactly as has be·en 
done in similar disputes respecting the relevance o.f in-
formation sought on discovery when its examination by 
an outside party has been thought to be not necessary 
and possibly prejudicial. This was essentially the posi-
tion taken by the decision of Chief Judge John J. Sirica 
of the United States district court in his decision of Au-
gust 29 (360 F.Supp. 1), which was affirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit on October 12. But President Nixon 
chose not to pursue his position in the Supreme Court. 
The transmogrification of the issue to one of constitu-
tional power is, in consequence, utterly countedeit. Now 
that the claim of absolute privilege has been made, we 
cannot help but be interested in its judicial outcome. To 
suppose that the outcome of the legal issue in any way 
affects the original question of the way in which the 
president tends to conduct himself, however, is unques-
tionably to be gulled once again. 
Taken even at face value, moreover, the many con-
stitutional claims have themselves been remarkable, and 
here again there is a striking similarity with the way in 
which the president is toughing it out with the law by 
escalating the character of his claim to the point where 
it is the claim itself, rather than his conduct, that grad-
ually captures the news and deflects attention. Perhaps 
nowhere was this better illustrated than in the Carswell 
nomination. 
As the Senate was coming down to the wire on that 
nomination, the president sought to deflect criticism of 
his judgment by insisting that the "real" issue was simply 
one of executive prerogative versus congressional usur-
pation. Wasn't it clear, he emphasized, that the Con-
stitution committed the power of Supreme Court ap-
pointments to the president? It was as though he want-
ed only to vindicate the responsibility of the office it-
self, acting as a dedicated surrogate of all presidents, 
past and future, determined to preserve their powers 
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against inroads by a jealous and partisan Senate. Judge 
Carswell was not the issue; rather, the issue was the 
Constitution. Redefined in that way, couldn't the pub~ 
lie readily understand that, whatever the questioned 
merit of the nomination, it really wasn't the Senate's 
just concern? 
But it was the Senate's concern, however the presi-
dent sought to persuade us otherwise. In fact, it turned 
out that the president had misquoted the Constitution, 
substituting a power to "appoint" for the lesser power to 
"nominate" and eliding the part of the clause in the 
Constitution that refers to the Senate's "consent." 
The other aspect of toughing it out with the law-the 
shifting of responsibility for the consequences after de-
tlecting attention away from the original issue~--also is 
apparent. The federal judiciary has been especially 
handy for this purpose, even more so than Congress. 
In 1970 Congress had made no provision for wire-
tapping or bugging suspected domestic dissidents with-
out judicial authorization or accountability, but the 
pre-sident again was alert to his own responsi!,ilities. 
"Separation of powers" and his prerogatives as chief 
executive precluded the courts from applying Fourth 
Amendment restrictions, he said. The president alone, 
unaccountable to anyone save at e'lection time or by 
impeachment, assuming it could somehow be learned 
what the president was doing, would determine the oc-
casions, groups, and peTsons to be surreptitiously moni-
tored in the national interest. 
"At Least He Had Done His Own Duty" 
In 1972 the Supreme Court rejected this view ( 407 
U.S. 297), denying that the Fourth Amendment ex-
empte!i the executive from its provisions whenever he 
might claim that domestic security warranted invasions 
of privacy without judicial authorization, but still the 
president seeks vindication from the result. He has im-
plied that the Court's decision is startling (although the 
lower courts had already held the same way, and, so far 
as I could determine, professional opinion regarded 
the president's own view as the only startling one), 
weakening to the public security, and possibly even sub-
ject to the na:ive constitutionalism that characterized the 
anti-law-and-order excesses of the Warren Court. At 
least, he reassured us, he had tried to do his own duty 
to his office by his unflinching effort<; of domestic 
surveillance. 
I followed each of these. issues with earnest academic 
interest, a little incredulous each time at the president's 
stated view of his own power, occasionally uneasy in 
the uncertainty that one or another court might be per-
suaded to his view (or that he might succeed in re-
staffing the Supreme Court with more compliant jus-
tices), but more nearly reassured when the "crisis" was 
past, and executive supremacy had not yet been read 
into the Constitution. But the recovery period was al-
ways shortlived. 
The president plied the same approach again when 
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he presumed to impound funds appropriated by Con-
gress for disbursement. Did the president really possess 
a double veto over acts of Congress? I was aware of the 
provision in Article I allowing a power of veto, but 
that, of course, is explicitly subject to being overridden 
by two-thirds majorities of both houses. Could there 
possibly be another, as the president claimed, nowhere 
mentioned in the Constitution but somehow implied in 
the office of the presidency-a double-speak preroga-
tive to take care that the laws be "faithfully ignored" 
rather than "faithfully executed," as the language in 
Article II declares? 
Judiciary Will Bear the Blame 
Thus far, the courts have held overwhelmingly against 
this view, although the matter has not yet been decided 
by the Supreme Court. Evidently speaking for the presi-
dent, Caspar Weinberger, secretary of the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, discounted the nu-
merous decisions against the president, making clear 
that nothing less than a decision by the Supreme Court 
would alter the president's course on this issue. Only if 
that Court will take responsibility will he desist, with 
the canny conso~ation of having depersonalized the issue 
and thrust the blame onto the judiciary. 
Consider also the remarkable uses of "constitutional 
responsibility" the president's actions have reflected in 
Cambodia. A short time ago he stood tall against Con-
gress in reassuring the country that should Congress 
forbid the use of funds for further military action in 
Cambodia, he was prepared to meet the responsibilities 
of his own office by diverting other appropriations al-
ready made. His presidential duty required no less of 
him, whatever might be lacking in Congress. 
Only was it later to be learned that previous repre-
sentations that the neutrality of Cambodia was being 
scrupulously respected were utterly false; that the, presi-
dent had authorized large scale bombing concealed be-
neath duplicitous reports for the benefit of seve,ral con-
gressional committees that presumably might not have 
been trusted with the truth. Was this, too, merely a 
question of "privilege" or "authority"? Back in January 
of 1971, moreover, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf 
resolution, under which President Johnson supported 
his original actions in that area, but President Nixon 
was quick to point out that he never regarded that reso-
lution of any importance to his authority. 
Watergate: An Issue Elevated to a Crisis 
The cases involving the Watergate tapes are doubt-
less interesting, and it is not at all wmng that they 
should be seen as posing important questions of con-
stitutional law. But, as in so many other instances, it 
may also be use-ful to note that the crisis is upon us 
not so much because of an issue that could not be 
avoided o-therwise, but that it is an issue inflated to 
the level of crisis only in light o-f the breathtaking char-
acter of the president's highly diverting view of his 
authority. The president, it was argued in his brief 
in court, is not subject to the judicial process at all. The 
doctrine of "separation of powers" precludes courts or 
Congress from subjecting him to subpoena. He is the 
sole judge, moreover, of what the pubHc interest may 
require in respect to papers or records within his cus-
tody. Neither courts nor Congress may presume to 
second guess a claim of executive privilege or to su-
pererogate an authority to require an explanation of its 
basis or sufficiency. It is simply a matter entirely within 
executive discretion alone. Like domestic surveillance 
and the Fourth Amendment? Like appointing justices 
to the Supreme Court? Like the power of war? Like 
the power to impound funds and the duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully ignored? Yes, evidently much 
like these. 
Disdain for a Tacky Quotation 
Last summer we watched with growing interest (and 
not a little apprehension) as John Ehrlichman toughed 
it out before the Senate select committee, laying claim 
to presidential powers of burglary as the president alone 
might think appropriate in the interest of national se-
curity. Is the Fourth An:wndment subject to suspension 
by an act of executive privilege? The. mere suggestion 
is disturbing, but there was Mr. Ehrlichman's very able 
counsel lecturing Senator Ervin that it might be so. 
At least, he pointed out, the Supreme Court had not 
had occas.ion to hold otherwise . when the president 
claimed an interest in "national security." What had 
happened, Senator Talmadge asked, to the understand-
ing that not even the king of England could· enter the 
most humble and dilapidated dwelling of his realm 
without the ownor's consent? Considerably "emded," 
Mr. Ehrlichman suggested, with just a trace of disdain 
at the senator's tacky quotation. 
None of this is to say that the Watergate tapes cases 
had an easy, foregone conclusion-that the• courts were 
bound to hold against the president or, indeed, that they 
should so hold. Other issues involved in the cases might 
trouble a conscientious court, ~nd there is an important 
area where claims of executive privilege should be 
treated with deference: not necessarily by utterly abdi-
cating and forswearing any power of judicial review, 
as the president's brief argued, but simply in the care-
ful and painstaking exercise of that review. A modest 
court, not desiring to appear unsympathetic to the 
needs of the presidency, even while being reluctant 
to affirm such far~reaching absolutes as President Nixon 
asserted, might struggle to find a less alarming basis 
at once more moderate and fair. 
Tapes Aren't Crucial to Select Committee 
It wuld do so were it to determine that the tapes 
at best are of only marginal value to the select com-
mittee since the committee's objective is to determine 
the need for additional corrupt practices legislation. Re-
solving particular conflicts of testimony regarding cer-
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tain White House conversations may not be important 
to its task, and accordingly it might not be unreason-
able to sustain the claim of executive privilege under the 
circumstances. 
President Has Not Acted Consistently 
The same analysis did not apply to the interest of 
the special prosecutor, since he was charged with the 
different task of determining whether existing criminal 
statutes (such as those concerning perjury and obstruc-
tion of justice) have been violated. Resolving conflicts 
of testimony by the possible corroborative (or exoner-
ating) value of the tapes would be highly relevant to 
his responsibilities. But as to him, exactly as Charles 
Alan Wright, the president's counsel, suggested, theTe 
was also an alternative to forcing disclosure of the tapes 
contr;try to the will of the president. If the court had 
concluded that indictments ought not be returned against 
persons when the president withholds material possibly 
vital to their prose"ution or defense, it may simply de-
clare that there can be no indictments or trials. 
This need not have been the result, of course, and 
the case on the other side is itself very impressive-most 
especially as the president had not acted consistently with 
his own claim of a need to maintaln the confidentiality 
of the conversations or even the confidentiality of the 
tapes he loaried to Mr. Haldeman. In confronting the 
courts with a direct challenge that the presidentis whol-
ly immune to any inquiry at all, however, his lawyers 
may have encouraged the courts to find a way to avoid 
that issue, rather than to appear to act from animus 
toward the president and to accept the blame. 
"Toughing It Out" Is a Last Resort 
Whatever the outcome in particular cases, there is 
nonetheless a more depressing pattern that has emerged 
from this strategy of toughing it out with the law. The 
more generous view, that the president is simply an 
extraordinary activist who cares deeply about the sepa-
ration of powers and means only to protect the integrity 
of his office from corrosive jealousieB of a petty Con-
gress and a permissive judiciary, is scarcely maintainable 
anymore. Rather, toughing it out with the law has been 
reduced to the most enfeebled function, a habitual last 
line of· defense whenever nothing else is left to say. 
In this sense, the Watergate tapes may even be a para-
digm case in which the questionable propriety of a deci-
sion is sought to be submerged in the very different issue 
of technical constitutionality. The president displayed no 
seemly concern for confidentiality in freely lending his 
tapes to the friendly witness, Mr. Haldeman, for in-
stance. It is difficult to become indignant with Her-
block's cartoon impression of how the president evi-
dently saw it: "It's a privilege," he says brightly, as he 
hands over the tapes to Mr. Haldeman. 
Possibly it was a privilege in the same sense that the 
Constitution may not forbid the president so to conduct 
himself, although it remains to be seen whether e·ven this 
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is true, but it scarcely seem~ to matter a great deal-
the list of "privileges" has simply, gotten out of hand. 
Milk dealers are allowed a sudden price rise following 
organized· contributions for the president's personal ben-
efit. The ITT. case is suddenly settled after a $400,000 
gift. American Airlines ransoms itself from political sky-
jacking. Two plumbers "misunderstand" instructions 
and burglarize a psychiatrist's .office. The acting director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also "misunder-
stands" and burns a file containing a falsified record 
implicating a former president in the assa~sination of a 
foreign head of state. Contributions given for campaign 
purposes are diverted to the defense of individuals under 
indictment for criminal invasion of opposition offices. 
Congress is lied to about the respected sanctity of a 
neutral country, and reports are falsified to make it 
believable. Letters are fabricated to misrepresent public 
reaction to presidential policy in mining foreign har-
bors, and polls are manipulated to demonstrate wide-
spread support. A lederal judge is invited to consider a 
presidential. appointment while presiding over a criminal 
trial in which the administration has a direct political 
interest. Following a thorough investigation that was 
never held, a firm statement clearing all White House 
personnel of any involvement is issued. Co-operation is 
pledged, assurances are provided that no one is to be 
protected, but what may be useful evidence is cur-
tained in secrecy save for the most safe and symbiotic 
witness, even while the president's counsel is advising 
a court that confidentiality of the evidence from all 
others is so important to the president as to warrant the 
possible abandonment of indictment or prosecution as 
an alternative to any further disclooure whatever. 
Notice by the Board of Elections 
The following jurisdictions will elect a 
state delegate for a three-year term begin-
ning at the adjournment of the 1974 an-
nual meeting and ending at the adjourn-
ment of the 1977 annual meeting: 
Alabama Montana 
Alaska New Mexico 
California North Carolina 
Florida North Dakota 
Hawaii Pennsylvania 
Kansas Tennessee 
Kenluckv Vermont 
M assachilsetts Virginia 
Mi5souri Wisconsin 
Nominating petitions for a I! state dele-
gate5 to be elected in 1974 must be filed 
with the Board of Elections at American 
Bar Association headquarters not later 
than January 30, 1974. All nominating 
petitions will be published in the March, 
1974, issue of the American Bar Associa-
timz Journal. 
While it is desirable that more than 
the required minimum of twenty-five 
names of members of the Association ap-
pear bn a nominating petition, only twen-
Merely interesting questions of law? An issue of priv-
ilege, perhaps, or one of separation of powers? Or, 
rather, a desperate strategy to avoid the inevitable con-
sequences of incredible hubris and overwhelming scan-
dal? 
From one office window at the law school where 
President Nixon was an excellent student more than 
thirty years ago, admittedly, the view I have of all this 
is far from perfect. Increasingly these days, however, it 
is pretty much deja vu. 
Calendar of Association Meetings 
Annual Meetings 
1974-Honolulu, Hawaii, A~gust 12-16. 
1975-Montreal, Canada, August 11·15. 
1976-Atlanta, Georgia, August 7-12. 
1977-Chicago, Illinois, August 6-11. 
1978-New York, New York, August 5·10. 
Midyear Meetings 
1974-Houston, Texas, January30-February 5. 
1975-Chicago, Illinois, February 19·25. 
1976~Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 
12·18. 
ty-five names of signers of any petition 
will be published, as provided by Section 
6.3 (b) of the Association's Constitution. 
Only signatures of members of the As-
wciation will be counted. Each nominat-
ing petition must be accompanied by a 
typewritten list of the names and address-
e's • of the signers in the order in which 
they appear on the petition. The petition 
must be accompanied also by a seventy-
five word biographical sketch of the 
nominee. Forms for this purpose will be 
provided. The biographical sketch will be 
included in the ballot material sent to 
each Association member in the state for 
which the nominee is a candidate for the 
office of slate delegate. 
A candidate for nominee aml all sign-
ers must be members of the Association 
whose membership is accredited to the 
state where the election is being held. 
There is no limit to the number of candi-
dates who may be nominated in any state, 
and the nominations are made onlv on 
lhe initiative of members themselve~. 
Each nominee for the office of state 
delegate is entitled to receive one· list of 
the names and addresses of the Associa-
tion members in his state. The list is to 
be made available only after the proper 
filing of a nominating petition, upon 
written request. 
Forms of nominating petitions may be 
obtained from the Board of Elections at 
the headquarters office of the American 
Bar Association, ·1155 East Sixtieth 
Street, Chicago, Jllinois 60637. Nominat-
ing petitions must be received at the 
headqm1rters of the Association hefore 
the close of business at 4:45 I' .M., Jan-
nary 30, 197 4. Ballots will be mailed to 
lhe members in good standing. accredited 
to the states in which elections are to be 
held, not later than March 15, 1974, so 
that they will be received by members at 
approximately the same time as the 
March issue of the Journal containing 
the nominating petitions of the various 
candidates. 
BOARD OF ELECTIONS 
WALTER F. RoGOSHESKE, Chairman 
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